



The Expo Foundation

A study on racially motivated crime and violence in Sweden

On behalf of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia

by

Stieg Larsson

The Swedish National Focal Point

Expo Foundation

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Executive summary

The purpose of this study is give an outline of the development of racial violence and racial hate crime in Sweden, as well as to map out the political and ideological spectre actively fostering xenophobic and anti-Semitic sentiments – the so called »national movement«.

The main source for all statistics on crime in the study is the annual report compiled by the Constitutional branch – *Författningsskyddet* – the Protection of the Constitution Section (PCS) of the Swedish Security Police (Säpo). The PCS annual report is also the only comprehensible source available that is also meeting standard guidelines for scientific accuracy. PCS guidelines for racially motivated crimes include xenophobia, anti-Semitism, homophobia and general white power scene related crimes – crimes with a common motivating factor that are often perpetrated by the same activists or ideological groups. This report will follow the guidelines of the PCS.

As for the chapter of this study mapping out xenophobic groups – the »national movement« – Expo Foundations own archives and knowledge is the main source, as well as studies by contemporary authorities on the subject.

This study will separate xenophobic groups and parties with parliamentary ambitions from the sector known as the »white power movement«.

Conclusions

Compared with other countries with a longer tradition of non-European immigration, such as France or Britain, racial violence and related hate crimes are relatively new phenomena in Sweden. Compilation of police records did not begin until the late 1980s, and indicate that racially motivated violence and related xenophobic crimes have steadily increased during the recent years when systematic compilation of data has taken place. In recent years the increase is from 1750-recorded incidents in 1997 to 2 670 in 2001.

The total figure of race politically motivated race hate crimes (including anti-Semitism, homophobia and other white power movement related crimes in 2001 amounted to 3 968 incidents.

Hate crime, all categories, 2001¹

	Total
Xenophobic	2 670
Anti-Semitic	115
Homophobic	208
TOTAL, crime against minority	2 993
Other white power related crimes (a)	975
TOTAL	3968

Activists associated with the white power movement account for an average of 9.1 of the homophobic crimes, 15.5 percent of the xenophobic crimes, and 22.8 percent of the anti-Semitic crimes. The figures should be taken with a measure of apprehension; hidden statistics are large and the identification of an incident being related to the white power scene depends on if a perpetrator is identified at all, or if the investigating officers during questioning are able to discern a specific connection with the white power movement.

At the same time the number of white power scene related crimes have increased more than xenophobic crimes in general; from close to 600 in 1997 to more than twice that amount, close to 1 400 in 2001.

The statistics shows that hate crimes are more likely to occur in areas with active xenophobic or white power groups than in parts of the country where few such groups exists, regardless of if there is any large number of immigrants present or not.

The Swedish »national« movement, which has been in a state of disarray and made up of a number of politically insignificant and isolated sects in post-war years, has reorganised and made a comeback since the early 1980s. The »national« movement is divided into »xenophobic groups« with parliamentary ambitions and the »white power movement«. The number of activists in both wings, as well as their political impact, has steadily increased in the 1990s.

- Propaganda disseminated by the »national« movement foster conspiracy theories about democratic parties and democratic politicians; the latter are described as »traitors« who are selling out the nation to a foreign »occupying power« – the immigrants. Xenophobic propaganda fosters suspicion about the media, democratic institutions and authorities. Anti-immigration sentiments and xenophobia is currently primarily targeting Arabs and Africans; Islamophobia is a key factor. The attack on World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 added fuel to the flames.

¹ Brottslighet kopplad till rikets inre säkerhet 2001, (RPS/Säkerhetspolisen, PCS Report 2001)

In September 2002 the xenophobic party Sweden Democrats made a breakthrough in the general elections, polling 76 300 votes; the party gained close to 50 seats in local municipalities, predominantly in south Sweden. The Sweden Democrats is thus the largest political party outside the national parliament.

- Propaganda disseminated by the »white power scene« is focusing on modernised versions of traditional anti-Jewish conspiracy theories. Militant white power groups – Blood & Honour, Swedish Resistance/National Youth and Info-14 argue for an armed struggle based on terrorism. Several militant groups are closely related to William Pierces' National Alliance in the United States, and take its inspiration from his book the *Turner Diaries*.

The Swedish white power movement is a leading producer of white power records, videos and other propaganda. Records produced in Sweden for a foreign market generates large sums of money, which in its turn help finance political activities.

1. Outline of scientific studies

The single comprehensive source on racial violence in Sweden is annually compiled by the Constitutional Branch of the Swedish Security Police (Säpo). The Constitutional Branch, formally the **Protection of the Constitution Section (PCS)**, is somewhat similar to the German Verfassungsschutz. An annual report titled *Brottslighet kopplad till rikets säkerhet* (Crimes relating to the internal security of the nation) is published each autumn, focusing on the previous year.

Although a number of studies focusing on racial violence have been made, very few such studies have been devoted to racial violence from a broader analytical perspective. Most such studies have instead focused on local phenomena or specific incidents such as the »Valberg ethnic cleansing«², a 1996 harassment of an immigrant family by local youth in the mid-western village of Valberg, or the »Klippan study«³ which focused on activities among a group of neo-Nazi youngsters in south Sweden. While such studies often give useful insight into specific problem areas, specific groups and specific ideologies, they rarely address the broader phenomena of racially motivated violence as such.

In the late 1990s Dr. Heléne Lööw, who is attached to the Crime Prevention Council (Brottsförebyggande Radet, BRA), headed a series of studies focusing on specific towns where high profile racist incidents had taken place or white power groups were active.

A 1998 government appointed committee investigation, *Racial and Xenophobic Violence (Rasistiskt och främlingsfientligt vald)*, is to date the most authoritative compilation of various aspects of racial violence. The investigations deal with all forms of racially motivated violence, but is also looking into legislation, political responses, the role of mass media and schools.⁴

1.1 The 1988 RPS Study

Police monitoring of racially motivated crimes and violence began in the late 1980s, following the emergence of a number of activist groups within the rightwing and an increased media coverage of violent incidents. In 1988 and 1989 a number of political refugee centres in small countryside towns were targeted by a string of fire bombings and assaults, while reports from large city areas claimed mounting skinhead violence against immigrants, homosexuals and anti-racists.

² *Rasistiska trakasserier* by Ulla Rantakiesu, Sabina Almgren and Bengt Starrin (Centrum för folkhälsoforskning, report no 1-1997) ISSN: 1100-9594.

³ *Rasismens yttringar – Exemplet Klippan*, by Berit Wigerfelt and Anders S. Wigerfelt (Studentlitteratur 2001) ISBN91-44-01670-0.

⁴ *Rasistiskt och främlingsfientligt vald*, Ds 1998:35; ISBN 91-38-20945-4.

In 1988 the government, i.e. then Minister of Immigration Leif Blomberg, called on the **National Police Board (Rikspolisstyrelsen, RPS)** to compile statistics on racially motivated crimes and violence. A project group established by the National Police Board requested all local police districts in Sweden (the police organisation is made up of 118 local districts) to list every reported complaint with a known or suspected racial or radical right signature during the four year period 1984-1987. This was the first attempt to establish a comprehensive overview of racially motivated crimes in Sweden.⁵ The project group was led by assistant police bureau chief Stig Westman, police department director Olof Gustafsson. Data was gathered by sending a questionnaire to the local police districts.

The study showed that in the 1984-1987 period 2 039 racially motivated crimes had been reported to or investigated by the police. According to this study a racially motivated crime took place every 12th hour in Sweden. The complaints had resulted in 257 convictions. The study concluded that the most frequently reported racially motivated crime was vandalism or theft. The study also noted 334 cases of assault and battery, 309 illegal threats, and 162 cases of harassment, 12 major violent crimes and one rape.⁶

The 1988 study, however, was met by a widespread criticism from immigrant groups as well as media and political organisations. There were serious question marks about the scientific validity and there was a confusion over the definition of what constitutes a »racially motivated crime«. No less than 42 police districts had responded that no racially motivated crime had taken place in the time period investigated; this included several large city areas such as Handen and Nacka in the greater Stockholm area, which had been a hothouse for neo-Nazi and skinhead activities and where several violent incidents had been reported in the media.⁷

Many of the critics agreed that the lack of response from a number of police districts where obvious incidents had occurred should not be interpreted as a lack of interest from the police in the issue, but rather as an indication of a confusion about what constitutes a »racially motivated crime«. Many crimes with obvious race hate factors involved are incorporated in the statistics as something else, for instance robbery or common assault; in many cases the perpetrator may be apprehended, charged and sentenced as a common criminal without reference to any political or ideological dimension.

A typical example of one such crime was frequently debated in the mid-1980s. In 1984, the period of the 1988 RPS study, two neo-Nazi activists associated with the Gothenburg branch of the notorious **Nordic Reich Party (NRP)**, a stalwart Hitlerite group, assaulted and tortured a 54 year old homosexual to death. A traditional key line in the NRP propaganda was the call for the extermination of homosexuals. When a similar incident took place a few years later the deputy party leader, German born Vera Oredsson, went on record claiming:

»It was a cleansing. We do not consider homosexuals as human beings. They are scum. Homosexuals are so despicable that I wouldn't touch them with a pair of pliers.«⁸

⁵ *Rasism och främlingsfientlighet – en undersökning av brottslighet med rasistiska och främlingsfientliga inslag m m.* (Rikspolisstyrelsen, RPS Rapport 1988:4)

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ *Extremhögern* av Stieg Larsson & Anna-Lena Lodenius, page 287 (Tiden, 1991)

⁸ Quoted in *Aftonbladet*, 1990-08-18.

Both young killers had participated in internal party education where hatred for homosexuals had been prominently fostered. Together with other members of the Gothenburg branch of the Nordic Reich Party they had taken upon themselves to systematically move around the city to harass and assault homosexuals outside gay clubs and bars. This was an organised political activity based on the premise that gay people do not reproduce and therefore constitute a »threat against the Aryan race«.

This particular murder was not included by the Gothenburg PD in the 1988 study. Neither was the fact that the 54 year old homosexual was also Jewish (although it is unclear if the perpetrators knew this), another group targeted by NRP hatred. It went down in police files as gross assault and murder.

1.2 Reporting by the Protection of the Constitution Section, PCS (Författningsskyddet)

By the early 1990s an increasing need had developed to keep a closer watch on radical right or racially motivated hate groups. This was partly due to that such groups, including the violent skinhead movement, had been rapidly evolving in the late 1980s, but also because the 1986 murder of Sweden's prime minister Olof Palme had demonstrated large gaps in the police's knowledge about rightwing extremism. Responsibility for monitoring racially motivated crimes had been transferred to the Security Police (Säpo) and ultimately to its department responsible for Protection of the Constitution Section, PCS (Författningsskyddet), currently headed by section chief Mr. Torbjörn Ekblom.

A 1993 PCS Report (published in 1994) was the first attempt to make a coherent study of racist and xenophobic crimes in Sweden.⁹ The report claimed 1 033 cases of racially motivated crime had been reported in Sweden in the year. A total of 137 crimes had been identified as »incitement of racial hatred«; this included Cross burnings, vandalism with racist graffiti, letters to individual immigrants or political leafleting. The same report noted 140 cases of »unlawful discrimination«, 102 of which made immediate references to colour of skin or ethnic background. The report also noted 52 cases of bomb threats, 31 of which were targeting political refugee centres.¹⁰

As was the case of the 1988 National Police Board report, the 1994 PCS Report was also met by a measure of criticism, not the least internally by the police researchers compiling the data. Again, the problem was partly how to define what constitutes a »racially motivated crime« and partly how to accurately compile data. The 1993 report was a trendsetter in the respect that it attempted to focus not only on strict »xenophobic crime«, but also looked at the broader activities of so called race hate groups. The statistics include, for instance, a case where two leading members of the extreme nationalist party the Sweden Democrats (SD) were apprehended by the police as they approached a large Left Party rally on May day in Stockholm city; the SD activists were armed with a live military hand grenade and were subsequently charged and convicted for an attempted armed attack (*allmänfarlig ödeläggelse*, which literally translates as a »devastation dangerous to the public«).¹¹

⁹ *Sammanställning 1993 avseende förekomsten av rasism och främlingsfientlighet inom riket* (Säkerhetspolisen, SA 159-1301-94).

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ The incident is recorded in *Sverigedemokraterna – den nationella rörelsen* by Stieg Larsson and Mikael Ekman (Ordfront, 2001) ISBN 91-7324-877-0.

Refining their analytical methods, a second PCS report mapping out *Crimes relating to the internal security of the nation 1994-1995* was published in 1997.¹² This report was the first in a series that has since been published annually since 1998, focusing on the previous year. This was a very ambitious report touching upon a large number of factors; which organisations are responsible, what is the distribution of male respectively female racial crime, in what specific geographic areas do crimes occur etc.

PCS reporting is also based on the complaints reported to local police districts; this is the basis for the statistics. In order to refine the data and to cover as much territory as possible, the Constitutional Branch in the mid-1990s carried out training seminars for local police officers, teaching how to evaluate local data and what to look for. Having gathered reports from local districts the PCS is also running all complaints to all local police districts through a computer programme, which is identifying app. 120 key words in the reports such as »nazi«, »immigrant«, »skinhead« etc. Reports flagged by the computer are then manually processed in order to scrape the »bottom of the barrel« and hopefully find cases which have been left aside by the local districts.

1.3 Methodological problems

The obvious flaw in the PCS reporting is of course the large amount of hidden statistics – police files only include complaints actually reported to the police. Researchers claim that it is impossible to accurately define how large the hidden statistics are, but including all cases of »Saturday night street incidents« or anonymous death threats by phone which are ignored or never reported, the actual figure of racially motivated crime is expected to be substantially higher than the official reporting. At the same time it is assumed that a majority of the more violent crimes are reported.

Events following the 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre gives an indication of how large the hidden statistics may be. Following 11 September the Police Intelligence Service (*Kriminalunderrättelsetjänsten, KUT*), followed the incident reporting of Islamophobic crimes, noting an increase in the immediately following weeks. KUT noted app. 5–10 incidents every day, with a peak of 18 incidents on 14 September, after which the number of daily incidents petered out and went back to »normal«.¹³

Taken together, the increase was far below what the KUT expected. However, visiting the Moslem Centre in Stockholm in November 2001 an Expo Foundation researcher was shown a large file of written anonymous treats, and was told of numerous anonymous phone calls. A number of the letters or phone calls constitutes an independent crime of harassment, threat or slander which has never been reported to the police. Statistics for 2001 could thus easily be increased by several hundred cases.

Generally, PCS reporting has become much more refined, detailed and accurate since the mid-1990s. Monitoring with such methods of racial violence has only been published consequential years only since 1997.

¹² *Brottslighet kopplad till rikets inre säkerhet 1994-1995* (RPS/Säkerhetspolisen, published 1997).

¹³ Reported to the EUMC/Raxen, Rapid Response: *Anti-Islamic and Anti-Arab sentiments in the wake of the World Trade Center bombings*, November 18, 2001.

One methodological problem with regard to compilation of statistics is that in some cases a single incident may generate a large number of complaints or criminal charges. This was the case, for instance, of a May Day rally in the mid-Swedish town Nora in 1998, where an illegal National Socialist Front rally developed into a small-scale riot, which left 73 individuals arrested. One single incident, for that reason, accounted for 73 cases in the statistics.

It is also important to note that what constitutes a racially motivated crime is occasionally based on the viewpoint of the victim at the time when the police complaint was made. In a few cases the definition of the crime may change during court proceedings that may take place a year or even several years later. The PCS system of reporting tries to take such situations into account, although it can be expected that one percent or more of the total incident reporting may be cases where the label of the crime has changed during judicial proceedings.

Finally, the willingness to report a crime may increase or decrease from one time-period to another. For instance, if an incident of racial violence is prominently reported in the media it may for a period of time increase the willingness of other victims to file complaints for similar incidents. There has never been any scientific study on the subject with regard to specifically racially motivated crimes, but research from comparable areas – for instance rape or violence against children – hints of a relationship between media focusing and willingness to come forward. It is generally assumed that media plays a large role in shaping the behaviour in society.

2. Definitions of terminology

Definitions of racially motivated violence and crimes

The Protection of the Constitution Section is the smallest of the four main branches making up the Swedish Security Police; the other being anti-terrorism, counter espionage and protection. Its main task is to defend the constitution against activities aiming to change the constitution by violence, treats or undemocratic means, or which aims at obstructing the democratic rights of individual citizens.

Crimes against the internal security of the nation are defined in several chapters of the Swedish penal code, in particular the Criminal law, although no legislation is actually giving a precise definition of what constitutes breaches of internal security.

The PCS Report is divided into two sub-groups, one analysing crimes carried out by the extreme right, one by the extreme left. The latter includes crimes perpetrated for such political reasons as »anti-fascist activities«, »animal rights activism«, »anti-Shell campaigns« etc. The extreme left section does not include racially motivated crimes and will be left aside in this report.

The word »race« and consequently the term »race hate crime« is used with caution; although the word «race» is used in most definitions of racism (including in the phrasing of the Swedish legislation) the term itself is seen as disputable. A Swedish parliament finding¹⁴ claim there is no scientific basis for classifying different human beings or ethnic groups into »races«. The word »racism« is therefore used as a term describing attitudes and actions towards minority groups, not as a definition of the minority groups.

PCS definitions and reporting include all forms of »hate crime«, equalling race hate, anti-Semitism and homophobia. PCS reporting separates hate crimes perpetrated by individuals organised in known race hate groups, (i.e. the white power scene), and crimes perpetrated by individuals not known to be affiliated with any specific political organisation (i.e. individuals of the broader public).

Racism: The word »racism« in PCS reports are used to describe an attitude or a viewpoint claiming a supremacy of its own ethnic group based on a perceived difference in »race«, national, cultural or ethnic background.

Xenophobia: The word »xenophobia« is used in a broader sense than »racism«, and describes a negative attitude, fear or resentment towards other ethnic groups.

Racist and xenophobic crimes: A term used by the PCS to describe crimes against individuals or groups of people based on their »race«, cultural, ethnic or national origin. This includes crimes directed against property.

¹⁴ *Betänkande* 1997/1998: KU29, Rskr 1997/98:185.

Anti-Semitism: crimes based on hatred or animosity against Jewish people or religion, or ideologically related crimes against Jewish property.

Homophobia: The word homophobia is used as an expression of hatred or animosity towards homosexuals. The PCS defines homophobia as a core sentiment of the white power groups, but also as a sentiment among individuals of the broader public.

White power group, white power movement, white power milieu, white power sub culture etc: the term »white power« is used to describe crimes relating to activists or adherents to the ideological supremacist subculture including neo-Nazi organisations, skinheads, certain anti-Semitic conspiracy theory groups etc. For the purpose of this EUMC report the phrase »*white power scene*« is used. Crimes committed under the auspices of the white power scene are not only related to members of specific racist or neo-Nazi groups, but also to the milieu as such; this includes crimes committed at for instance a white power rock concert etc, by individuals who can not be linked to specific groups by membership cards etc.

The PCS hate crime reporting doesn't make any distinction between »racism«, »anti-Semitism«, »homophobia« and general »white power scene criminality« although cases are reported under separate chapters. White power scene crimes are included although they may not have any immediate bearing of racism – for instance illegal arms trading, burglaries, attacks on local politicians etc, are included as crimes carried out by race hate groups. Following the attack on World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, it has been suggested that »Islamophobia« should be singled out as a fifth category.

The »national movement« is a term used to describe the political universe of the extreme right through the 20th Century. The »national movement« is used to describe a multitude of groups, parties, ad hoc organisations and friendship circles making up what is in popular terms often described as the »extreme right«. The term »extreme right« is per definition temporary and not useful; what is »extreme« depends on what is considered extreme by the mainstream of the society at a given moment – this may change dramatically over time and from country to country.

The »national movement« is by no means a uniform movement; on the contrary it is often contradictory and riddled by factional warfare. The unifying factor is a basic anti-democratic ideology, often based on conspiracy theories, racism or anti-Semitism, and contempt of democratic politicians and institutions. Activists of the »national movement« often moves from one group to another.

3. Hate crime and racial violence in Sweden 1997-2001

Given the limitations posed by the hidden statistics, the Protection of the Constitution Section (PCS) reports a steady increase of racial crimes in Sweden all through the 1990s. In this study only statistics from 1997 and onwards, which are based on the refined data collection technique, will be used. A compilation of figures shown that the number of crimes reported to local police offices have increased from 1 752 in year 1997 to 2 670 in 2001.¹⁵ The total number of »hate crimes« was 3 968, including anti-Semitism, homophobia and other white power scene related crimes.

Figure 1:
Distribution of recorded hate crimes, all categories, 2001¹⁶

	White power related	% white power total	Not white power related	Total
Xenophobic	373	16,2	2 297	2 670
Anti-Semitic	21	18,2	94	115
Homophobic	8	3,8	200	208
TOTAL, crime against minority	402	15,5	2 591	2 993
Other white power related crimes^(a)	975	100	-	975
TOTAL	1 377	34,7	2 591	3968

(a) Crimes perpetrated by white power scene activists, but not immediately related to racist activities – for instance illegal arms trading, robbery etc.

The statistics show that white power scene activists account for 15,5 percent of all racially motivated crimes against minority groups (xenophobic, anti-Semitic and homophobic combined).

This leaves 84.5 percent of all racially motivated crimes as being committed by individuals who are not related to the white power movement, i.e. common Swedes with no particular political background. Including all racially motivated crimes, i.e. crimes committed by white

¹⁵ *Brottslighet kopplad till rikets inre säkerhet 2001*, (RPS/Säkerhetspolisen, PCS Report 2001) report written by Michael Johansson, Security Police analysist attached to the Protection of the Constitution Section (RPS/Säkerhetspolisen, 2002) ISBN 91-87203-82-0

¹⁶ *ibid*

power activists but not immediately targeting minority groups, the white power scene accounts for about one third, 34,7 percent, of racially motivated crimes in Sweden. This figure is not entirely accurate because it leaves out comparison with »other crimes« – for instance theft, assault etc – committed by the group non-white power activists who are committing race hate crimes.

However, the figure does give an indication of the comparably high number of crimes committed by the relatively small group of white power activists.

3.1. Xenophobia

Xenophobic crimes are defined as crimes against an individual of ethnic minority background due to colour of skin, language, cultural or religious background.

Figure 2:
Total number of recorded xenophobic crimes^(a), 1997-2001
(white power related and non-white power related)¹⁷

Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Crimes reported	1 752	2 210	2 363	2 572	2 670

(a) Excluding anti-Semitism, homophobia and related white power scene criminality.

Figure 3:
Recorded xenophobic crimes, 1999-2001^(a)
(White power related crimes compared with non-white power related)¹⁸

Year	White power related	Non-white power (other)	Percent white power of total
1999	317	2 046	13,4
2000	538	2 034	20,9
2001	373	2 297	13,9

(a) Statistics for 1997 and 1998 does not include white power scene figures for specifically xenophobic crimes, only for the total of hate crime.

Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that although the number of recorded white power related cases of xenophobia decreased following a peak in 2000, the total number of xenophobic crime have steadily increased in the five year period.

Crimes related to the white power scene account for a total of 16 percent of all xenophobic crimes reported during the three-year period.

¹⁷ *ibid*

¹⁸ Statistics based on RPS/Säkerhetspolisen, PCS Report 2001.

Somewhat inexplicably, the PCS report¹⁹ argues that the increase in the number of cases between 1997 and 1998 (Figure 2) is partly due to a large number of arrests made at two single incidents. During a New Year white power concert in Brottbys outside Stockholm close to 300 individuals were arrested, and on the 1 May no less than 73 young Nazis were arrested during an illegal National Socialist Front riot in the mid-Swedish town of Nora.

While the argument has some validity in the Nora situation, the Brottbys arrests only resulted in eight specific charges. Nor does this argument explain why the number of reported white power scene related cases have remained high and even increased in the ensuing years when such »mass arrests« have not taken place.

A much more convincing argument is that the large increase in white power related crime between 1997 and 1998 can be explained by the fact that several leading neo-Nazi groups (National Youth/Swedish Resistance, Info-14, Blood & Honour and Nordland) were in a period of transition and re-organisation between 1996-1998, following several years of high profile activities in the first half of the 1990s.

Due to the relative loose structure of white power organisations, some of the figures should be taken with a measure of caution. The dramatic increase of white power related crime in year 2000 followed by a decrease in 2001 compared to crimes committed by non-white power scene related individuals may very well be co-incidental rather than due to an increase of activities in specific white power groups.

Long term statistics indicate that white power crimes account for one third of all crimes relating to racism and racist group's activities.

Figure 4:
Type of crime 1997-2001: total number of recorded xenophobic crimes
(white power related and non-white power related)^(a)²⁰

Type of crime	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Murder, manslaughter	0	0	1	0	0
Gross assault(b)	19	32	31	29	25
Assault	327	382	435	377	409
Harassment/harassment	608	780	852	1 003	1 038
Slander	217	311	319	337	360
Vandalism	108	112	118	165	134
Graffiti	60	40	58	76	74
Incitement of racial hatred	166	257	249	354	391
Illegal discrimination	165	193	210	158	160
Other crime	82	83	68	52	51
Lacking specific crime category	0	20	22	21	28
TOTAL	1 752	2 210	2 363	2 572	2 670

(a) Excluding anti-Semitic crimes, homophobic crimes and crimes relating to the white power movement.

(b) Includes attempted murder or attempted manslaughter.

¹⁹ *ibid*, PCS Report 2000, page 23.

²⁰ *Ibid*, PCS Report 1997, 1998 and 2001.

The PCS statistics show a sudden increase in the number of recorded crimes between 1997 and 1998, followed by a smaller but steady growth in the ensuing years. There may be several reasons explaining the sudden increase in the late 1990s. One factor which should not be dismissed is that both media and authorities have focused very much on racially motivated crime in the last decade, which may have increased not only the willingness for individual victims to come forward and press charges but also increased the readiness of civil servants – for instance headmasters at schools – to report cases under their jurisdiction. Another reason is that the attitude of the society has sharpened. Cases – particularly when it comes to what is judged to be incitement of racial hatred – which would have been thrown out of court ten years earlier will now result in convictions. A example of such sharpened attitudes is the carrying of swastika armbands or patches, which would not have been charged in the early 1990s, is now considered to be an act of incitement.

At the same time the propaganda activities and spreading of material has increased, not only in the white power milieu but also among populist and other extreme nationalist groups with xenophobic leanings.

- The most common racially motivated crime is found under the category of »threats and harassment«, which has increased by 70 percent over the past five years.

This is one of the categories where it is most difficult to determine the origin of the crime – white power related or not. Only about ten percent of the cases have a clear connection to a national socialist ideology or white power group – for instance that an anonymous hate letter has been signed with a swastika or a verbal statement has referred to ideology. A similar situation exists for the category of slander.

- The crime category which has increased the most in the five year period is incitement of racial hatred; 135,5 percent.

- The annual caseload of the categories »assault« and »gross assault« remain relatively constant between 400 and 500 reported incidents every year. The latter category includes such severe cases of assault and battery that the prosecutor will charge as attempted murder.

- The 25 cases of gross assault reported in 2001 include two attempted murders; in one case a stabbing and in one case a car bombing, both of which had a xenophobic background.

- The single case of murder immediately relating to xenophobia was a 1999 stabbing of an immigrant in the township of Skogas outside Stockholm. However, it should be noted that in the time period several other murders relating to white power groups and activities have taken place. (*See 2d. Crimes related to the white power movement.*)

3.2 Anti-Semitism

Crimes of anti-Semitic nature are defined by the Protection of the Constitution Section as crimes against individuals of Jewish descent, against Judaism as a religion or against Jewish property etc. To be classified as an anti-Semitic crime it is not necessary for the victim to be Jewish; it is defined as anti-Semitic if the perpetrator believes the victim to be Jewish or for expressing specific anti-Jewish sentiments, for instance when apprehended by a policeman etc.

The PCS Report views anti-Semitic crimes of special interest due to the strong tradition of anti-Semitism connected to the extreme right. As in the case of xenophobia, there is an unknown amount of hidden statistics. Violent crimes against Jews or Jewish property are usually reported, while cases of harassment, intimidation or threats may sometimes be played down for fear of encouraging other anti-Semites or copy cats through media publicity.

Figure 5:
Total number of recorded anti-Semitic crimes, 1997-2001
(white power related and non-white power related)²¹

Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Crimes reported	99	119	125	131	115
Related to white power	na	na	36	28	21
Percent white power	na	na	28,8	21,4	18,2

Although the absolute number of anti-Semitic cases is much smaller than the number of xenophobic incidents, which make statistical comparison uncertain, it should be noted that the percentage of white power related incidents are higher than for xenophobic incidents. White power xenophobic crimes account for an average of 15.5 percent, while white power anti-Semitic crimes account for 22.8 percent. At the same time the absolute number of white power related cases have steadily decreased in the last three year period.

The crime types of slander and incitement, pose a certain contradiction. It is the experience of researchers monitoring far right propaganda – not the least on the Internet – that the number of articles and statements made has increased dramatically over the past ten year period. A possibility is therefore that a certain process of accustoming is taking place; texts and propaganda that would have caused media attention and would have been taken to court 20 years ago are now so common that it is not seen worthwhile to file a complaint.

A typical example of this is the treatment of Ahmed Rami’s so called Radio Islam (which is basically a vehicle for traditional Nazi anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that has preciously little to do with Islam as a religion). Following two trials against Ahmed Rami in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Radio Islam closed its broadcasts and moved to the Internet. For several years the same type of statements that earned Rami convictions in the previous trials have been propagated on the Internet without any visible reaction. The Internet propaganda is far more gross and vulgar than the original radio broadcasts; indeed, the 2002 homepage includes a hate list of Jews living in Sweden.²²

Figure 6:
Type of crime 1997-2001: total number of recorded anti-Semitic crimes
(white power related and non-white power related)²³

²¹ *ibid*, PCS Report 1997, 1998 and 2001.
²² Following media attention in September 2002, Justice Minister Thomas Bodström ordered an investigation into the Radio Islam internet page.
²³ PCS Report 1997, 1998 and 2001

Type of crime	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Gross assault (a)	1	0	1	0	1
Assault	9	7	10	8	7
Harassment/harassment	35	41	39	43	41
Slander	3	5	10	9	9
Vandalism	10	13	9	3	8
Graffiti	5	6	17	8	12
Incitement of racial hatred	27	36	32	50	33
Illegal discrimination	0	0	0	1	0
Other crime	9	7	3	8	1
Lacking specific crime category	0	4	4	1	3
TOTAL	99	119	125	131	115

(a) Includes crimes defined as attempted murder or attempted manslaughter.

As in the xenophobia case file, incitement of racial hatred and harassment/harassment are the two most common anti-Semitic crimes.

- None of the eight violent crimes – assault or gross assault – have any visible connection to the white power scene. In only one of the eight cases can it be determined that an individual was assaulted directly due to Jewish descent; the victim was carrying a piece of jewellery with the star of David, which also constituted the motive for the assault. In the other seven cases, including one of gross assault, the police report is unclear about if the perpetrator knew the victim was Jewish or not. In these cases the anti-Semitism is based on statements such as »fucking Jew« etc.

3.2 Homophobia

Homophobia constitutes a special sub-chapter in police statistics of hate crime; homophobic crime is defined as a crime against a member of a minority group due to sexual orientation; because the victim is a homosexual or because the perpetrator believes that the victim is a homosexual.

Homophobia is included in PCS statistics of racial violence due to the fact that gay people are one of the most common and vulnerable targets for extreme violence by activists in neo-nazi and white power groups. Ideologically homosexuals are defined as enemies of the »Aryan race«, as »mud people« etc. There are numerous examples of neo-Nazi propaganda texts or lyrics in white power music inciting to violent acts against gay people.

As a minority group, homosexuals are more likely to become victims of gross violence – organised gay bashing – than any other minority group; not surprisingly gay immigrants are in a particularly vulnerable situation.

In the past 20 years at least 15 homosexuals have been murdered by activists connected to the white power scene. Nazi gay killers are often commemorated in various forms, for instance in lyrics in white power records.

A not unusual graffiti in Sweden are the numbers 18/62 or 88/62. The number 18 is Nazi symbolism for the letters A and H, to be interpreted as Adolf Hitler, while 88 stands for Heil Hitler. The figure 62 refers to the slaying of a well-known gay elite hockey player, Peter Karlsson, killed in 1995. Peter Karlsson was killed with 62 stab wounds; his killer was the leader of a local neo-Nazi group, the so-called **Westra Aros SA** in the town of Västerås near Stockholm.²⁴

Figure 7:
Total number of recorded homophobic crimes, 1997-2001
(white power related and non-white power related)²⁵

Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Crimes reported	151	226	207	185	208
Related to white power	Na	na	12	33	8
Percent white power	-	-	5,7	17,8	3,8

There are two obvious sources for statistical faults; one is that the perpetrators of many anti-homosexual crimes are never apprehended, and secondly that hidden statistics are considered to be far higher than in cases of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. Victims of homophobia are considered more likely to avoid filing complaints with the police because they may not wish to be known in public as gay and for fear of retribution and additional victimisation.²⁶

Figure 8:
Type of crime 1997-2001: total number of recorded homophobic crimes
(white power related and non-white power related)²⁷

Type of crime	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Murder/manslaughter	2	0	0	1	0
Gross assault(a)	3	3	1	2	5
Assault	26	40	59	36	45
Harassment/harassment	55	76	82	75	79
Slander	27	57	36	31	42
Vandalism	12	16	9	17	10
Graffiti	9	16	19	10	9
Incitement of racial hatred	0	2	0	4	6
Illegal discrimination	3	4	3	5	6
Other crime	14	11	6	4	5
Lacking specific crime category	0	1	1	0	1
TOTAL	151	226	207	185	208

(a) Including crimes defined as attempted murder or attempted manslaughter.

²⁴ *Expo magazine* 4-5/1997 published an mapping of neo-Nazi incitement of violence against homosexuals.

²⁵ PCS Report 1997, 1998 and 2001.

²⁶ According to a 1996 Stockholm university study; *Hat, hot, vald – utsatta homosexuella kvinnor och män* by Eva Tiby and Ingrid Lander, (Folkhälsoinstitutet 1996).

²⁷ PCS Report 1997, 1998 and 2001.

Curiously, in spite of the high profile anti-gay propaganda disseminated by white power groups, statistics show that only a minority of the crimes are directly linked to white power activists. Only an average of 9.1 of the crimes in the past three years have a white power relation, compared with 15.5 percent for xenophobia and 22.8 percent for anti-Semitism.

However, although no formal study has been made, there are reasons to believe that many of the most violent crimes directed against homosexuals– murder, assault and gross assault – are perpetrated by activists from the white power milieu. It should be remembered that in many cases no perpetrator has been apprehended and in such cases the only way to determine a white power link is if the perpetrator is described as such by clothes, by patches or by shouting slogans with a Nazi content. Of the three murders committed in the five-year period 1997-2001, two are definitely white power related.

In one case the perpetrators were known activists for many years in neo-Nazi organisations and had recently formed a sect of their own known as Lucifer's Order or the Black Order. In the second case the murder was perpetrated by a mentally disturbed individual who left a note with a swastika. In the third case the motive is ambiguous and the police report is vague about any political connection.

Looking back in time a similar pattern emerges. Between 1984 and 1995 neo-Nazi activists were responsible for at least five, possibly six murders of homosexuals.²⁸ It has been impossible to find any statistics of any total number of homosexuals killed in the same time period, but murder is a rare crime in Sweden and the five murders must amount to a substantial part of the total figure.

3.4 Crimes related to the white power movement

Activists in the white power movement generate a surplus of crimes which are not necessarily racist in character or immediately targeting a minority group, but which are seen by the activists as carried out »in the name of the cause«. This is regardless of if it is arms theft, assault on a local politician or bank robbery. White power crimes are therefore included in every PCS Report as crimes of ideological nature – hate crimes or »racially motivated crimes«.

Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories constitute a key motivating factor in white power ideology and criminality. Since the late 1980s, the prevailing theory among Swedish neo-Nazi organisations is the concept of ZOG, a Zionist Occupation Government or a Jewish conspiracy to rule the Western world. The concept of ZOG originates with American conspiracy theoreticians developed in the 1970s and 1980s by among others William Pierce (National Alliance), Ben Klassen (Church of the Creator) and Richard Butler (Aryan Nations). The concept of RAHOWA, a Racial Holy War carried out by an armed and revolutionary »white underground«, further encourages neo-Nazis and young »race warriors to take up arms in the struggle against ZOG«.

The enemy is defined as authorities, police officers, the »state«, politicians, media and teachers. In this situation a bank robbery – even if it is carried out for personal gain – can be explained as a »militant«, »legitimate« and »politically acceptable« action.

²⁸ Accounted for in *Expo magazine* 4-5/1997.

For that reason it is not difficult to explain why prisons house so many neo-Nazis – who by themselves constitute a very small minority group of about 2 000 activists in Sweden. Nor is it difficult to explain why groups of nazi prison organisations have developed. Convicted Nazis consider themselves POW:s, »prisoners of war«, and often branches out to other criminal organisations such as outlaw biker clubs etc.

Figure 9:
Total number of recorded white power crimes, 1997-2001²⁹

Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Crimes reported	598	1 198	1 331	2 092	1 377

Figure 9 shows a strong total increase of white power related crimes; from close to 600 in 1997 to almost twice as many, 1 200, in 1998. To some extent this statistical development can be explained by the fact that in 1997 the PCS was still developing the tools for data collection and quite possibly many white power convictions were never reported as such.

The number of reported crimes have since been reasonably steady between 1 000 to 1 500 annual complaints. An exception was year 2000, when the figure climbed to more than 2 000 reported crimes. The PCS report believes this may be coincidental rather than proof of a real statistical increase. As figure 10 shows the bulk of the increase was made up of »lesser crimes« such as vandalism, graffiti and incitement, while »harder crimes« such as gross assault and assault only increased slightly.

Figure 10:
Type of crime 1997-2001: total number of white power crimes³⁰

Type of crime	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Murder/manslaughter	0	0	4	0	0
Preparation for murder	3	0	0	0	0
Gross assault	na	9	20	29	16
Assault(a)	35	34	100	108	61
Harassment/harassment	59	105	272	440	223
Slander	5	9	21	40	17
Vandalism	84	197	226	389	242
Graffiti	91	184	258	423	361
Incitement of racial hatred	153	246	330	534	378
Illegal discrimination	0	0	0	0	2
Other crime	53	150	80	103	57
Lacking specific crime category	na	9	20	26	20
TOTAL	469	940	1 331	2 092	1 377

(a) Figures for 1997 are not compiled in a similar manner as in the ensuing years. The category »assault« in this graph includes causing bodily harm (1 case), violence against a public servant (7 cases), violent resistance (3 cases). The statistics does not separate gross assault from assault.

²⁹ PCS Report 1997, 1998 and 2001.

³⁰ PCS Report 1997, 1998 and 2001.

1999 was a year with a sudden eruption of extremely violent activities among neo-Nazi militants. Four murders and three attempted murders related to white power activities took place during the year.

- Following a May 1999 botched bank robbery in the small town of Kisa, south of Stockholm, two police officers chasing the robbers were captured and brutally murdered with »execution style« head shots. As the robbers attempted to make their escape they initially opened fire with automatic weapons and hand grenades against a third police officer; this was later charged as attempted murder. The three killers were well known neo-Nazi activists, two connected to the **National Socialist Front (NSF)** and one connected to the now defunct so called **Reich Front (Riksfronten)** and to Nazi prison organisations. All three were arrested following a massive manhunt, and in the following trial a total of seven young Nazis were charged with assisting the robbers or for having helped prepare the robbery.

- In October three activists connected with **Info-14** and the Stockholm based organisation **National Youth/Swedish Resistance (Nationell Ungdom/Svenska Motståndsrörelsen)**, assassinated a trade unionist outside his apartment house in south Stockholm. The victim had a few weeks previously exposed an attempted Nazi infiltration in the trade union at his local workplace. The three killers were part of what has been described as the »Nazi intelligence organisation« Info-14, who is mapping out »enemies« of the white struggle. When police seized the computer of one of the killers, personal information such as home address, family situation, photos, cars etc, for several hundred journalists, anti-racists, politicians etc were found.

- The fourth murder in the 1999 statistics was the New year stabbing of a Turkish immigrant in Skogas outside Stockholm.

- In June 1999 a car bombing targeted two journalists in Nacka, a Stockholm suburb. The journalists, a married couple, had for several years specialised in exposing the white power music industry. As the situation unfolded the husband and the couple's eight year old son were badly injured. The police investigation determined that the bomb was meant to kill. No arrests have been made.

- An additional attempted manslaughter occurred in the town of Kungälv in June 1999, when a man was stabbed after having argued with a small group of neo-Nazis.

Following the eruption of violence in 1999, activists on the white power scene kept a lower profile in 2000. During the year 108 cases of assault and 29 cases of gross assault were reported to the police. This is the highest total figure in the five-year period between 1997-2001, although the extent of gross violence seems to have been relatively less. Only one case of attempted murder was reported; an immigrant in the mid-south town of Nybro was verbally abused and stabbed.

This trend continued in 2001 when two of the gross assaults that took place were defined as attempted murders; none of which were considered to be related to the white power scene.

4. Geographical distribution of crimes

In absolute figures, large city areas such as Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö account for a larger portion of the complaints filed with the police, while more remote areas – particularly in the north of Sweden and a belt south of the great lakes in southern Sweden – account for a minor number of cases.

This conclusion remains when figures are translated into cases per 100 000 inhabitants, often regardless of a larger or smaller proportion of immigrants in the area.

Figure 11:
Geographic distribution of xenophobia: number of complaints (main crimes) per 100 000 inhabitants, and total number of cases, year 2001³¹

County	Xenophobia Complaints per 100 000 inhabitants	Xenophobia. Total number of complaints
Örebro	43,9	120
Stockholm (a)	35,9	654
Södermanland	30,5	78
Västmanland	28,8	74
Skane (b)	28,6	323
Blekinge	22,6	34
Kalmar	22,5	53
Västra Götaland (c)	19,8	296
Halland	19,3	53
Uppsala	19,0	56
Dalarna	18,7	52
Gävleborg	16,8	47
Värmland	15,6	43
Jönköping	15,3	50
Västernorrland	14,6	36
Östergötland	13,1	54
Norrbottn	12,1	31
Kronoberg	11,3	20
Västerbotten	11,0	28
Jämtland	7,7	10
Gotland	3,5	2

(a) Including city of Stockholm. (b) Including city of Malmö. (c) Including city of Gothenburg

³¹ ³¹ PCS Report 2001.

One question debated over the years is what relationship exists between active xenophobic groups/white power groups and xenophobic crimes. Previous statistics (Figure 3) indicate that white power groups represent app. 16 percent of all recorded xenophobic crimes. The group »other«, (non-white power related perpetrators) which represent 84 percent of all xenophobic crimes, is much more difficult to define. This group includes (a) perpetrators never identified, (b) perpetrators identified but where no obvious link to the white power scene is established, (c) perpetrators representing xenophobic groups not connected with the white power scene, for instance members of the Sweden Democrats etc; and of course (d) perpetrators with no specific political affiliation; i.e. »ordinary Swedes«.

Although no formal scientific study has ever been made, establishing a direct relationship between racial violence and the presence of race hate groups, it is often assumed that racial violence is linked to the emergence of a racially motivated extremist right. Certainly, much evidence points to this conclusion; skinhead violence and attacks carried out by Nazi activists often make media headlines, and a number of court sentences also link well known activists to crimes.

However, certain findings contradict a uniform conclusion. In the last two years of the 1980s, a period when a large number of political refugees arrived in Sweden, a series of fire bombings (i.e. Molotov cocktail attacks) were carried out against political refugee centres in mid-Sweden. While many of the perpetrators were never apprehended a surprising number of those that were proved to be local youngsters with no formal membership in or relationship to organised racist groups; in many cases there wasn't even an active racist group in the immediate neighbourhood.

However, looking beyond formal memberships, journalists noted that almost all of the attacks had been preceded by anti-immigration propaganda campaigns with posters or leaflets, carried out by groups such as the Sweden Democrats etc.³² A reasonable conclusion would therefore be that a certain percentage of racially motivated crimes are not carried out by activists in race hate groups, but rather by ordinary youths inspired by propaganda disseminated by such groups.

What inspires the growth of racially motivated youth groups is the subject for an entirely different study. However, in a recent lecture a young anti-racist journalist, Daniel Poohl, gave an example of his own experience growing up in the small village of Akersbruk in the western countryside. When Daniel was in school in the first half of the 1990s a peculiar »racist subculture« emerged among his class mates: indeed, as his friends dressed in skinhead uniforms and boots it was suddenly »fashionable« to be »a little bit of a racist«. For a while it seemed »as if the whole school had suddenly transformed into a wing of a national socialist organisation«.³³

What struck Poohl so curious was that in the village of Akersbruk no racist organisation or white power group had ever existed, nor was there any leader or organiser present in his school – indeed, not in the entire village. The racist subculture seemed to emerge out of thin air. Poohl's conclusion is that the inspiration came from other sources; partly from the emerging Internet, but more from white power music, which made a breakthrough with the fashionable band Ultima Thule in that period. »Young kids in Akersbruk simply watched

³² *Extremhögern* by Stieg Larsson & Anna-Lena Lodenius (Tiden Publishers, Stockholm 1991).

³³ Story recounted by Daniel Poohl at a teachers seminar in Höganäs, Skåne, May 2002.

what skinheads were doing on news reports on television and began imitating what they looked at«, Poohl concluded.

Figure 12:
Presence of major white power group or xenophobic/extreme nationalist party compared with geographic distribution of recorded xenophobic crimes per 100 000 citizens.³⁴

County	Complaints per 100 000 inhabitants	Active white power organisation ^(d)	Active extreme nationalist/populist party ^(d)
Örebro	43,9	NSF	SD(*) , ND
Stockholm ^(a)	35,9	B&H , NSF, NU , Info14	SD(*) , ND(*)
Södermanland	30,5	NSF	
Västmanland	28,8	NSF	SD
Skane ^{(b)(e)}	28,6	B&H , NSF, NF	Populists(*) , SD(*) , ND
Blekinge	22,6	NSF	SD(*)
Kalmar	22,5	NSF	
Västra Götaland ^(c)	19,8	NSF, NU, NS	SD(*) , ND
Halland	19,3	NSF	SD
Uppsala	19,0		SD(*)
Dalarna	18,7	NSF	SD(*)
Gävleborg	16,8	NSF	
Värmland	15,6		SD(*)
Jönköping	15,3	NU	
Västernorrland	14,6		SD(*)
Östergötland	13,1	NU, NSF	
Norrbottn	12,1		
Kronoberg	11,3		
Västerbotten	11,0		
Jämtland	7,7		
Gotland	3,5		

(a) Including city of Stockholm.

(b) Including city of Malmö.

(c) Including city of Gothenburg;

(d) Bold letters indicates strong group or strong presence.

(e) An election alliance made up of local populist parties, Welfare of Skane, won 47 seats in local municipalities in the 1998 election; these parties include Sjöbopartiet, Skanepartiet, Kommunens Vål, CentrumDemokraterna, Burlövs Vål, Framstegspartiet and others.

() Counties where the Sweden Democrats or the National Democrats have won seats in local municipalities in the 2002 election.*

³⁴ Based on PCS Report 2001; organisational presence established by Mikael Ekman, Expo Foundation, September 2002.

Undoubtedly many of the incidents of racial violence in Sweden are carried out by individuals not connected to any racist organisation, such as the typical Saturday night brawls under influence which develop into fighting. A pattern emerges where many of the fire bombings against refugee camps in the late 1980s were carried out by local youngsters – possibly inspired or incited by outside propaganda campaigns – who got drunk on weekends and talked themselves into filling a bottle with petrol and hurling it at a building which had perhaps been talked about among neighbours as something of a controversy.

However, equally undoubtedly a distinct relationship exists between the presence of active hate groups and anti-immigrant groups and the number of complaints noted in the PCS statistics.

Figure 11 shows the geographic distribution of complaints for xenophobic crimes per 100 000 inhabitants compared with counties with active white power or xenophobic groups.³⁵ The counties leading the hate crime statistics also have the largest presence of race hate groups.

³⁵ The definition of »active groups« for Figure 11 is not absolute; for instance, the Sweden Democrats boasts about local branches in almost every county, many of which in reality are only made up of one or two activists with a post box and precious little activity. Selection of areas with »active groups« indicate a real and substantial organization with regular activity and ability to carry out propaganda campaigns etc.

5. Post-war development of the white power movement and xenophobic groups in Sweden

Undoubtedly racially motivated crimes have occurred in Sweden previously in history. Ideologically motivated race hate crimes, however, is a phenomena emerging in the 20th century, particularly in the latter half. Although Sweden has had numerous political extreme nationalist or national socialist organisations, very few have amounted to more than small political ripples. In the golden age of Hitlerism, when national socialism developed into mass parties in several countries in Europe, the Swedish working class and middle class turned to the promise of prosperity offered by social democracy and liberalism, instead of to the political adventurism.

Sweden was thus, compared to many other European countries, never much of a market for organised anti-Semitism, race hate groups and Nazism. This is not to say that such groups haven't existed in Sweden; on the contrary – such groups have constituted a minor parallel universe of conspiracy theories, anti-democratic sentiments, racism and anti-Semitism.

5.1 The historic »national« movement

The »national movement« has very little to do with »nationalism« as such; it was a movement born in the 1920s and made up of numerous groups which protested modern society, democracy and women's suffrage etc. Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories as well as race biology were dominating ideological factors for the »national« movement, which soon developed into pro-fascist organisations. One of the first such organisations was **Sveriges Fascistiska Kamporganisation (SFKO) – Sweden's Fascist Struggle Organisation** – which was launched in 1926. This was largely a discussion club, soon transcended by more efficient propaganda organisations.

Three organisations competed with each other in the 1930s. The oldest was **Sveriges Nationella Förbund (SNF) – Sweden's National League** – which had actually been formed in 1915, but which didn't turn anti-democratic and pro-Hitlerite until the early 1930s. In 1934 three members of parliament defected from the conservative party to join SNF. They remained in parliament until the election 1936 and are the only openly pro-fascists ever to hold seats in the parliament.

In 1929 **Svenska Nationalsocialistiska Arbetarepartiet (SNSP) – the Swedish National Socialist Workers Party** – was formed. This organisation was led by Birger Furugard who was one of the first Swedish's fascists to form ties with the German national socialist party. SNSP was soon eclipsed by the so called »Lindholm Movement«, **Nationalsocialistiska Arbetarepartiet (NSAP) – the National Socialist Workers Party** – which was led by Sven Olof Lindholm.

All of the parties who had supported Germany in the war fell apart in the post-war years. SNF survived into the 1990s, although for the last 50 years or so it was not much more than a private club for elderly gentlemen.

A fourth war time organiser was Per Engdahl, for a while deputy leader of the SNF, who formed his own party organisation known as **Nysvenska Rörelsen (NsR)** – the **New Swedish Movement**. Engdahl is probably the single fascist leader who ever had any international standing or importance. In the 1950s Engdahl was one of the key organisers of the so-called Malmö Brown International, the **Europäische Soziale Bewegung**, which organised several important European Fascist organisations such as the Italian **Movimiente Sociale Italiano (MSI)**. Engdahl also wrote the so-called *Carta di Roma* in 1950, a programme for political reconstruction of the fascist movement adopted by the MSI and other ESB member organisations. The ESB was crucial for bridging the gap between wartime fascism and remnants of the post-war years, although already in the 1960s the organisation had more or less fulfilled its purpose. In Sweden Engdahl kept the NsR alive up to his death at age 85 in 1994. By that time the movement was basically made up of veteran stalwarts.³⁶

While Engdahl's followers were looking for a more respectable form of fascism, uniformed Nazis gathered in **Nordiska Rikspartiet (NRP)** – the **Nordic Reich Party** – formed in 1956 and for a period the only modern Nazi organisation of significance in Sweden. NRP was formed by Göran Assar Oredsson, who has remained party leader to this day. The party became a focal point for a number of veterans from defunct pre-war Nazi groups in Sweden and although a certain amount of youngsters were recruited every year, the party remained an isolated and politically insignificant sect. The importance of NRP has instead been to function as a bridge between the pre-war movement and the modern groups that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s.

Regardless of its self-promoting propaganda, nothing could hide the fact that time had surpassed the traditional organisations. By the late 1970s it was obvious that the existing parties were housing cranks, uniform fetishists and ageing stalwarts that could offer very little appeal to a younger generation of political activists. To youngsters it was increasingly clear that if the »national« movement would ever break new ground in Sweden, new organisations and new leaderships must be formed.

Ironically, it was Per Engdahl, now in his seventies, who gave the clue about how the new movement should be formed. In 1979 he wrote an article titled *The danger of immigration*³⁷, where he argued that the »science« of racial biology which had dominated the movement since the 1920s and onwards, had to be abandoned. Engdahl concluded that modern genetics had established that the movement might very well have been wrong all those years – »we know to little about the subject« – but immediately concluded that it did not mean that racism as such had to be abandoned. What the movement had to do was instead to focus on cultural differences.

5.2 Development of race hate propaganda in post-war years

It doesn't much to discern that the case files of racial discrimination and its practical application in the shape of racially motivated violence and crimes have increased dramatically

³⁶ There are numerous books and sources describing the Fascist movement of the 1950s. One of the first was *Nynazismen* by Armas Sastamoinen (Federativ, 1961) One of the most authoritative works on wartime nazism in Sweden is *Hakkorset och Vasakärven*, the doctoral thesis by Heléne Lööv (Gothenburg university, Department of History, 1990)

³⁷ *Invandringens riskeer*, published in *Vägen Framåt*, the magazine of the New Swedish Movement (april 1979).

in Sweden in recent decades. Judging from the content of media press files, convictions for racially motivated violence and race hate propaganda was comparatively unusual in Sweden 30 or 40 years ago.

Before the Second World War there was no legislation prohibiting incitement of racial hatred in Sweden. This fact did not prevent anti-Semites from being convicted of race hate propaganda under the laws against slander, harassment of individuals or disturbance of the peace. Following the war, obvious expressions of anti-Semitism and racial hatred were limited to surviving hardcore Nazi organisations and a few individuals who became known for distributing particularly vicious anti-Semitic hate propaganda.

The first specific legislation against incitement of racial hatred was adopted in 1948, following a much publicised trial against one Einar Aberg, an ardent and internationally known distributor of anti-Semitic propaganda. Aberg was sentenced on no less than six occasions in the 1940s and 1950s. The law against incitement of racial hatred originally became known as «Lex Aberg».

In the 1960s and 1970s cases of organised or individual race hate activities were rare and perpetrators were generally viewed as cranks or fanatics.

In media archives a case from 1982 sets the standard – a six month sentence against Ditlieb Felderer, who became internationally known for sending crude letters and vulgar handbills to Jews and politicians abroad. Some of the envelopes contained samples of hair with letters claiming it was remains of Jews from Auschwitz.

Felderer was (and remain) basically a one-man crusade of anti-Semitic hatred, but his 1982 six month prison sentence gained him respect among fellow travellers abroad and for some time he became a household name in international anti-Semitic circles. A pamphlet by Felderer, *Anne Frank's Diary – A Hoax*, pretended to scientifically expose the Frank book as a forgery produced by »international Jewish propagandists«. For a few years Felderer was a leading light among nazi revisionist historians of the U.S. based so called **Institute of Historical Review (IHR)**, where he was mentioned together with internationally famed revisionists such as Robert Faurisson or David Irving.³⁸

In 1989 the Swedish Justice Chancellor filed charges against **Radio Islam** and its publisher, Moroccan born political refugee Ahmed Rami. For two years Rami had been running a community radio station which broadcasted some of the vilest anti-Semitic propaganda in Europe since the publishing of *Der Stürmer* in the 1940s.³⁹

Radio Islam, which has nothing to do with Islamic groups or the religion of Islam, has become a vehicle for neo-Nazi propaganda, including the publishing of conspiracy classics such as the *Protocols of the learned elders of Sion*. Rami was sentenced to six months in prison but resumed broadcasts in the 1990s until he transformed the radio station into an Internet web site. An updated hate list of Jews living in Sweden was published in the summer of 2002; the police is investigating the matter since September 2002.

³⁸ See, for instance, *Extremhögern* by Stieg Larsson and Anna-Lena Lodenius (Tiden 1991).

³⁹ A summary of Radio Islam's importance can be found in the anthology *Det eviga hatet (The eternal hatred)* published by the Swedish Committee against Anti-Semitism (Bonniers, 1993)

The legislation against incitement of racial hatred was used on very few occasions before 1980. Such occasions generally gained large media attention. The rare use of incitement laws can be linked directly to the fact that before 1980 Sweden had very few organised racist groups, and the groups that existed were generally isolated sects with very little, if any, influence in society.

Following 1980 the situation has changed dramatically. With new active hate groups publishing leaflets and new magazines, with the coming of the white power industry, CD records and videos and, not the least, with the emergence of Internet, a multitude of sources and channels of distribution have appeared. While the organisations of the 1960s and 1970s could only expect to reach a very limited audience, race hate groups today can through Internet reach the same audience as the largest media, government information service or any educational project.

If anti-Semitic or race hate material was a rare phenomena in 1970, thirty years ahead every Nazi poster, CD record, video, magazine or Internet homepage boasts a propaganda which is far more inciting. While the propaganda of the 1970s would gain massive media attention and soon result in criminal convictions in a court of law, the same propaganda is today published by hundreds of outlets with almost no police investigation-taking place. To an extent it can thus be said that the race hate groups have »won« the battle and been able to stretch the limits of what is acceptable to society. Anti-Semitic propaganda and incitement of racial hatred is still forbidden according to the law, but since the early 1990s the publishers of such propaganda have been able to go about their business with relatively small fear of actually being arrested and charged.

5.3 Xenophobic groups with parliamentary ambitions

1979 saw the launching of a new kind of racist organisation **Bevara Sverige Svenskt (BSS) – Keep Sweden Swedish**. BSS was a new kind of racist campaign organisation, which took its line from Per Engdahl's suggestion that race biology had to be abandoned and replaced by an emphasis on cultural differences between the »Nordic people« and the foreigners threatening to transform Sweden into a Moslem dictatorship. BSS was largely modelled on the British organisation **National Front** of the 1970s, which had also exchanged uniforms and old rhetoric for a suit and tie image of young concerned »patriots«. Anti-Semitism was largely taboo and biological racism had been proved scientific nonsense; what remained was to focus on new issues – the cultural incompatibility of the immigrants.⁴⁰

The political rhetoric changed. BSS strongly denied being »racist« (although the group had difficulties explaining why almost every known activist also was or had been a member of various Nazi or Fascist organisations), but focused on cultural differences to foster suspicion against immigrants. The claim was no longer that »foreigners were threatening the Swedish race« (although such sentiments still remained close to the surface), but rather that »foreigners are threatening the cultural stability of the Nordic countries« or »foreigners are taking all the jobs from Swedes« etc. On the ideological level, nothing much else had changed from the 1930s; the »enemy« was once again the democratic parties and politicians, the media and the

⁴⁰ For a summary of BSS, see *Extremhögern* by Stieg Larsson and Anna-Lena Lodenius (Tiden 1991), and *Sverigedemokraterna – den nationella rörelsen* by Stieg Larsson and Mikael Ekman (Ordfront 2001)

authorities who are »betraying Sweden«, »committing treason« and »conspiring to sell out the nation«. Immigrants are often described in military terms as an »occupying force«.

Although BSS was a small organisation with only a few hundred followers, it represented a departure from the stale impotence of the previous post-war organisations. BSS came into media focus due to a number of provocative leaflets and actions. The race issue was still obvious in the very first leaflet BSS distributed in 1979, which claimed:

»For every year the Swedes become fewer. Four years ahead there will be no Sweden for the Swedish. We will perhaps have a Turk as a dictator and a Negro as foreign minister. The population will then become a chocolate brown bastardisation that can not speak cannot speak Swedish.«⁴¹

Although small, the organisation soon grew larger than most other post-war groups and among members a feeling of a newborn political enthusiasm was born. Briefly, in the mid-1980s, BSS united the Swedish extreme right under one umbrella before it again began dividing into two political wings. This was not an ideological split with sharp lines of division, put rather a tentative development of two different modes of activity where individual members could still move between the factions or be organised in both camps at the same time.

One section of the BSS took its inspiration from larger parties such as Jean-Marie Le Pen's **Front National** in France or the **Vlaams Bloc** in Belgium. In 1988 this faction transformed BSS into a political party, the **Sverigedemokraterna (SD)** – the **Sweden Democrats**, which has since been the most important xenophobic party in Sweden.

By the end of the 1980s the issue of immigration for the first time had a political impact outside the traditional extreme right. In the 1988 election the local branch of the mainstream **Centerpartiet (Centre Party)** in Sjöbo, south Sweden, rebelled against the party's pro-immigration stand. The Sjöbo branch refused to accept political refugees in the municipality. The local branch, led by farmer Sven-Olle Olsson, was swiftly expelled from the Centre Party, but went on to form a new party, **Sjöbopartiet** (the **Sjöbo Party**).

The local election campaign became a dirty affair where local pro-immigrants as well as journalists covering the affair received numerous anonymous threats. On Election Day the rebels won a landslide local victory, although it has been suggested that many of the voters elected to support Olsson due to what was perceived as heavy-handedness and arrogance on the side of the central bureaucracy in Stockholm. Nevertheless, Sven-Olle Olsson became an overnight household name and a hero of the »national« movement – the local man of the people who dared to challenge the authority. In the 2002 election Olsson, now in his seventies, ran on a Sweden Democrat ticket.

The late 1980s coincided with a period of relatively large amount of immigration, again boosted in the early 1990s by the outbreak of war in former Yugoslavia. It seemed as if anti-immigration sentiments would become a permanent issue in future elections. In 1991 a large national populist party with an anti-immigration stand was launched – **New Democracy (NyD)** led by count Ian Wachtmeister and record producer Bert Karlsson. NyD appeared from

⁴¹ Quoted in *Sverigedemokraterna – den nationella rörelsen* by Stieg Larsson and Mikael Ekman (Ordfront 2001)

nowhere. Formed in December 1990 and without a coherent political executive as late as May 1991, the party won 6.7 percent of the vote and parliamentary representation in the September 1991 election. NyD was not immediately launched as a racist party, but it attracted a number of local populists and anti-immigration campaigners who soon turned the party into a playground for political eccentrics.

Already in 1994 the voters had had enough of the chaos and abandoned NyD; the party dived to 1.7 percent of the vote and lost its seats in parliaments. By 1998 the NyD had changed its party leader so often that political journalists had to use a broadsheet to keep track of what faction was currently in power. In May 1998 then party leader John Bouvin tried to boost NyD popularity by merging with a small neo-Nazi organisation. The party won 8 000 votes in the 1998 election.⁴²

While NyD kept the media's attention the first half of the 1990s, two other political forces were developing. In Skane, Sweden's southernmost county, a variety of anti-immigration local populist parties joined forces in an election alliance, **Skanes Vål (The Welfare of Skane)**, winning 26 500 votes and 47 seats in local municipalities. The alliance was made up of, among others, **Sjöbopartiet**, **Skanepartiet**, **Kommunens Vål**, **Burlövs Vål**, **Centrum Demokraterna** and **Framstegspartiet**, all of which represented dissatisfaction with the political establishment.

The other force was the **Sweden Democrats**, who spent the last half of the 1990s trying to distance the party from its Nazi legacy. In 1995 a new party leader, Mikael Jansson, took over the reins. Jansson, contrary to his predecessor, was not recruited from the Nazi scene but from the mainstream Centre Party. One of his first actions was to issue a ban on political uniforms at public party meetings and functions.

Sweden Democrat image has shifted in the 1990s. The party, which as late as 1995 was dominated by well-known Nazi activists, has cleaned up its act. Obvious racist rhetoric has been tuned down and the party programme has been »liberalised«; the party no longer argues for capital punishment for serious crimes and enforced repatriation of immigrants. The changes have been born out of necessity. In order to make an electoral breakthrough the party must attract dissatisfied voters who are not primarily voting *for* SD, but rather *against* the established parties. As long as SD appears as a »Nazi connected party«, it will repel potential voters. As a result the rhetoric and party programme has been tuned down to the extent that in 2001 a core section of the activists in the Stockholm branch rebelled – stating that SD had now been transformed into a »liberal party«, the Stockholm branch splintered and formed a new party, the **National Democrats (ND)**. The ND has thus taken over a large portion of the cadre most connected to Nazism or previously sentenced for criminal offences.

5.4 Nazi organisations in the 1990s.

The success of the BSS also benefited older groups. In the early 1980s, the veteran Nordic Reich Party, went through a period of growth among youngsters. In 1985 a large number of activists in the NRP's so called Party Actions Groups, were arrested and sentenced for a number of crimes ranging from vandalism to assaults and death threats against individuals.

⁴² For an excellent summary of New Democracy, see *Svensk överklass och högerextremism under 1900-talet* by Karl N. A. Nilsson (Federativ 2000).

Two activists were sentenced for a brutal homicide of a 56-year-old homosexual, who was tortured to death.

In the 1980s clashes between Nazis – where the emerging skinhead movement also found an organisational home – and groups of anti-racists became increasingly frequent. In 1986 a young anti-racist, Ronny Landin, was kicked and beaten to death by a group of drunken skinheads on the eve of Midsummer. The same year a skinhead, Ronny Öhman, was beaten to death when a group of »nationalists« clashed with a mixed group of immigrant and Swedish youngsters. The street level tension mounted.

The other section of the BSS took its inspiration from foremost the British skinhead scene and various nazi organisations in the United States. Of utmost importance to this movement were books such as the *Turner Diaries* by **National Alliance** leader Dr. William Pierce, which propagated traditional anti-Jewish conspiracy theories and a Racial Holy War – RAHOWA – by means of terrorism and armed struggle.⁴³

This section took the form of the pro-terrorist **Vitt Ariskt Motstånd (VAM) – White Aryan Resistance** – in the early 1990s. VAM was never a formal organisation with a defined leadership and card-carrying members, but rather an abstract ideological grouping that attracted skinheads and hardcore Nazis in various cities. As such VAM activists had read the *Turner Diaries* and, inspired by its rhetoric of launching a racial holy war through a militant underground, tried to copy what its American predecessor **The Silent Brotherhood** had tried to accomplish in the early 1980s.

VAM activists carried out a night time hi-jacking of a local police station and carried off 30 Sig-Sauer automatic pistols – arms for the revolution. Other activists attempted burglaries at military arms depots, and at least one bank robbery was carried out to build a »war chest« for the revolution. In the summer of 1991 a manhunt for the assumed ringleader took place. Several VAM activists were captured and sentenced to prison.

While bank robbery was the method for building a war chest suggested in the *Turner Diaries*, the movement soon realised that Sweden was too small for such activities to go on unnoticed. By 1993 such antics were no longer necessary – the white power music scene made a breakthrough when the skinhead band Ultima Thule was marketed by a mainstream record company and for a brief period was one of the most fashionable bands in Sweden. The white power record industry became the most important source for the financing of political activities. Sweden developed into an internationally important nation for the extreme right – as producer of the records and videos that were banned in, for instance, Germany.

The white power industry peaked in the mid-1990s, which can also be viewed by the number of violent incidents that took place at the time. In 1995 alone, at least seven people in Sweden were murdered in nazi related violence. The most notorious cases includes the torture-murder by four skinheads of a 14 year old boy, the stabbing of a political refugee by the leader of a local nazi organisation in south Sweden, and the murder of a homosexual who was killed with 64 stab injuries. Additional cases that year concerns known nazi activists in non-politically related killings, one internal affair and a still unsolved murder of a 16 year old skinhead hanger on who was murdered after a skinhead party.

⁴³ *Turner Diaries* by William Pierce writing as Andrew MacDonald, (National Alliance, 1978)

Several members of VAM and other white power groups were arrested and sentenced to prison for a variety of crimes, which in its turn gave birth to a new phenomena – Nazi prison organisations, so called »POW organisations« such as the **Yellow Cross** and the **Aryan Brotherhood**. The Nazi prison organisations also began mixing with other non-political criminal organisations, for example outlaw biker gangs such as the Hell's Angels and Bandidos, which further cemented the links between Nazi activism and crime.

The white power movement has since developed into groups such as **Blood & Honour/Scandinavia**, the **National Socialist Front (Nationalsocialistisk Front – NSF)** and **National Youth/Swedish Resistance (Nationell Ungdom/Svenska Motståndsrörelsen (NU/SMR))**. This is the violence prone so called »white power movement«, organising app. 2 000 members and supporters.

In spite of years of open propaganda calling for a race war based on terrorism, Sweden was largely unprepared for the string of violent incidents that plagued the nation in 1999.

In May 1999 two young police officers were brutally murdered »execution style« in the small village of Malexander, south of Stockholm. The killings took place after a botched bank robbery where the perpetrators escaped by car. A local police officer who tried to stop them was met by fusillade of bullets from automatic weapons and three live hand grenades. The policeman, much to his own surprise, survived the incident unharmed. His two colleagues, who happened to come across the escaping robbers several kilometres from the scene, were not as fortunate. The killers were soon identified as members of the **National Socialist Front (NSF)**; they captured and sentenced to lengthy prison sentences.

In June 1999 two well-known freelance journalists who made up a husband-wife team, Peter Karlsson and Katarina Larsson, were targeted in a car bombing. For several years Karlsson and Larsson had specialised in exposing the white power industry in articles published by the largest dailies in Sweden. As events unfolded, Peter Karlsson set out one morning to drive the couple's 8 year old son to a playground. As Peter Karlsson turned the key to the engine, a powerful explosive underneath the vehicle detonated while the mother watched from the apartment window.

According to the technical investigation, the bomb was meant to kill. Both Peter Karlsson and his son survived, mainly because the journalist couple had recently bought a new car with a reinforced structure for increased traffic safety. Peter Karlsson, however, was badly injured and will have permanent damages to his spinal cord.

To date, no arrest has been made, but the police investigation soon focused on a group of activists connected with the pro-terrorist National Youth (Nationell Ungdom – NU), which is based in Stockholm.

A few months after the bombing, three members of NU were under police surveillance. The police noticed the trio had an interest in an apartment building, but did not link the Nazis to any special apartment. However, one night in October, literally minutes after surveillance for the evening had been terminated, the trio entered the building and murdered one Björn Söderberg with six pistol shots to his head and back. Söderberg was an activist in the leftwing Syndicalist trade union; he had never been involved in anti-racist work, but a few weeks previously he had blown the whistle on a well-known Nazi leader at his work place who was attempting to become elected to the board of a local union.

Three Nazis were arrested and sentenced to lengthy prison sentences. Police raids in their apartments uncovered a mass of evidence of organised nazi activities, including a computer file of journalists, politicians and anti-racists who had been under the scrutiny of the group.

1999 included several other cases of violence; on November 30 that year the four largest (usually competing) Swedish dailies joined forces and for one day published the same articles protesting Nazism and Nazi violence.

5.5 Key issues of modern race hate propaganda ideology

Together the suit & tie Sweden Democrats and similar groups, and the white power movement broadly make up the organisations of the modern Swedish »national« movement. Although it has never been scientifically proved in any formal study, it can be safely assumed that the absolute bulk of the race hate propaganda published in Sweden is either produced by or distributed by this political spectre.

The propaganda is often based on emotional and unfounded speculations about immigrants, has become increasingly professional over the years, and is in certain respects a thriving industry of white power CD-records, concerts, video films, Internet home pages and mail order firms etc. Beginning with the forming of BSS in the early 1980s, the caseload of racially motivated incidents have indeed mounted.

Race hate propaganda follows certain given guidelines:

- **Racism.** The fostering of anti-immigrant sentiments is the glue that keep the movement together.

Standard propaganda claims a cultural incompatibility between Swedes and immigrants. Immigrants are portrayed in terms of a violent »occupying force« that is waging a war on Swedish citizens and account for a majority of all crimes committed in Sweden. The Sweden Democrats, for instance, have launched a core argument claiming that group rape is a phenomenon that has arrived in Sweden together with immigration since the 1960s. The argument is of course historical nonsense, but has been used in emotional and successful propaganda campaigns in a number of schools.

- **Conspiracy theories.** Both Sweden Democrat and white power propaganda claim that the political establishment has »betrayed« the Swedish people, and that democratic politicians in various forms are acting as »agents of foreigners«.

- **Contempt of democracy and democratic institutions.** Democratic institutions and democratic politicians are described as »anti-democratic and un-Swedish elements« who are working hand in glove with »the militant left« to combat the unsung heroes of a democratic struggle. In this propaganda the Sweden Democrats, for instance, is described as a group of freedom fighters under the oppression of the state and state organs.

Closely related to this propaganda are attacks on media (who hide the truth from the people), teachers (who help brainwash the Swedish youth), police organisations (who is physically suppressing the nationalist freedom fighters) etc. These arguments are in one form or another

disseminated by all »national« groups, but becomes wilder and more absurd the more openly Nazi an organisation is.

- **Anti-EU sentiments.** To be opposed to the European Union is by no means considered »extreme« in Swedish politics. While the majority of the population voted in favour of EU membership, all mainstream parties foster dissidents in one form or another. The »national« movement, however, doesn't mean exactly the same thing as »normal« opposition to the EU.

The European Union is seen as an evil federalist ambition to combat nationalist sentiments among the European peoples. In its place the »national« movement argues a »regionalist Europe« with »increased local democracy«. The slogans are almost attractive; Scotland to the Scottish people, the Flanders to the Flemish people etc. – in other words: re-draw the European map according to ethnic borders.

There are two objections associated with this policy formula. One is that this was tried in former Yugoslavia for several years of the 1990s – the experiment was not entirely successful and not without certain ethnic dilemmas.

The other objection is that some ethnic groups are never ever mentioned in the visionary propaganda of regionalist Europe – Jews and Roma. Where, in Europe, is a line to be drawn on a map establishing a »Jewish national state« or a »Roma homeland«. And is such a piece of land can't be identified – what then will happen to such ethnic minorities. This issue is rarely addressed in any »national« text.

Anti-EU propaganda also includes a number of conspiracy theories. For instance, one Swedish group running anti-EU campaigns on the brink of obsession is the small Christian religious party **Ny Framtid (NF) – New Future**, which claim the EU is a »Catholic strategy« to regain control of the Protestant north.⁴⁴

From a propaganda point of view there is very little difference in content and emphasis between the »parliamentary« and the »white power« wing of the movement. Arguments and sources are often borrowed between the two wings; for instance statistics on the cost of immigration, claims of immigrant violence against Swedes and claims that group rape is a phenomena imported to Sweden together with mass immigration.

The only absolute difference in the propaganda is that the national socialist groups still to some extent includes traditional race biology in its propaganda, and that the white power movement remain obsessed with anti-Semitism while the »parliamentary« wing has desperately avoided any mention of Jews in the 1990s.

Following the 11 September attack on World Trade Centre this distinction may develop into the first serious an ideological difference since the days of the BSS.

While the national socialist groups, in particular the National Socialist Front, have expressed understanding for »anti-American sentiments in the Islamic world« and claimed the United States only had itself to blame for years of support to Zionism, the Sweden Democrats used the event to foster additional suspicion about Islam. Two days after the WTC attack, the

⁴⁴ Although a conspiracy group, Ny Framtid is not a racist party and should not be included in the »national« movement. NF is rather a devout fundamentalist Christian party with certain rightwing ambitions who is supported by factions among the Pentecostals and other small independent congregations.

Sweden Democrat homepage claimed that the Swedish government was partly responsible for the attack because Arab immigrant organisations (as do all larger immigrant organisations) in Sweden receive an amount of economic sponsoring.⁴⁵ Following 11 September, party organiser Tommy Funebo has also written a few texts broadly supporting Israel in the ongoing conflict in the Middle East; his position has been ridiculed on various extreme right chat sites on the Internet, as being »pro-Zionist«.

5.6 The 2002 election: a success for the Sweden Democrats

Running in four elections between 1988-1998, the xenophobic Sweden Democrats increased from a mere 1 100 votes to 20 000 votes and eight seats in municipal assemblies in 1998. The party has steadily increased its vote election by election.⁴⁶

The party is still far away from the four percent votes needed to enter the national parliament, but it is by a wide margin the most successful »national« party since the war.

Launched in 1988, the party ran its first serious election campaign in 1991. The party was hoping that the Sjöbo rebellion in the late 1980s would have created a climate of protest vote against the established parties.

The analysis was correct; in early 1991 however, count Ian Wachtmeister launched the **New Democracy (NyD)** party, which polled 6.7 percent in the September elections and soaked up most of the vote the Sweden Democrats was aiming for. SD was left with a mere 5 000 votes and two seats in local municipalities.

By 1994 NyD had already collapsed and won only 1.7 percent of the votes. NyD lost its parliamentary representation, but again soaked most of the vote the SD was hoping for; the party had to be satisfied with only 13 000 votes and five local seats.

In 1998, NyD was finally no longer a competition. That year, however, Ian Wachtmeister staged a comeback with a new party propagating anti-immigrant sentiments – **The New Party (DNP)**. The Wachtmeister comeback was a disaster; DNP only polled 25 000 votes, but managed to cause a tremendous confusion in the election campaign.

In addition, a non-national party, which does not belong to the extreme right, Sweden's Pensioner's Interest Party (SPI) ran a campaign calling for a decreased immigration in favour of Sweden's elderly; SPI proved to be SD's toughest competition in many local districts.

⁴⁵ *SK-Kuriren*, the party Internet homepage on www.sverigedemokraterna.se/sd-kuriren, 13 September 2001.

⁴⁶ For a year by year analysis of SD's elections, see *Sverigedemokraterna – den nationella rörelsen* by Stieg Larsson & Mikael Ekman. (Ordfront 2001).

Figure 13:
Anti-immigration parties in the 1998 election⁴⁷

Party	National vote
Sweden Democrats	20 000
New Democracy	8 000
DNP	25 000
TOTAL	53 000

Regional parties:	
Welfare of Skane	26 000
Sweden's Pensioners Interest party (SPI)	55 000

All of the SPI vote cannot automatically be assumed to be »anti-immigrant« – there were many reasons why people voted for the SPI – but it can be expected that at least a few thousand voters turned to the party for that reason. Thus the anti-immigration vote of the 1998 election was, between thumb and forefinger, somewhere between the 53 000 votes won by the SD, NyD or DNP, and up to perhaps 70 000-75 000 votes. This was the political landscape that the Sweden Democrats must conquer to make a national breakthrough.

Internal post-election analysis by the Sweden Democrat leadership blamed the lack of progress – not without justification – on New Democracy, SPI, DNP and other »populist parties«.⁴⁸

In the September 2002 election the Sweden Democrats finally won something that must be considered the first breakthrough for a »national« organisation since the 1930s.

In the general election the party scored 76 300 votes, about 1,4 percent, making SD the largest party outside the Swedish parliament. SD also won 49 seats in municipal assemblies, which will make the party a contender for parliament in the next elections, 2006. In addition, about 10-15 local seats went to parties closely cooperating with the Sweden Democrats; Sjöbopartiet, Burlövs Vål and others.

⁴⁷ Statistics compiled by Expo Foundation; Figures are rounded.

⁴⁸ SD party secretary Jimmy Windeskog, *Nationalism in one country* (SDU pamphlet, 2000).

Figure 14:
Sweden Democrat election results 1988-2002⁴⁹

	National vote	Seats in local municipalities
1988	1 100	0
1991	5 000	2
1994	13 000	5
1998	20 000	8
2002	76 000	49

Figure 15: Distribution of Sweden Democrat seats in local municipalities, September 2002⁵⁰

County	Seats in local municipalities
Örebro	1
Stockholm	1
Södermanland	-
Västmanland	-
Skane	30
Blekinge	6
Kalmar	-
Västra Götaland	4
Halland	-
Uppsala	1
Dalarna	1
Gävleborg	-
Värmland	4
Jönköping	-
Västernorrland	1
Östergötland	-
Norrbottn	-
Kronoberg	-
Västerbotten	-
Jämtland	-
Gotland	-

⁴⁹ Statistics compiled by Expo Foundation; figures are rounded.

⁵⁰ Statistics by the Election Authority; at the time of writing this study the final count had not yet been announced; figures may change by a small margin.

6. Active »national« groups and parties in 2002

By 2002 the Swedish »national« movement is divided into two main wings, on one hand the white power movement and on the other the suit and tie parties and groups aiming for parliamentary respectability.

6.1 The Parliamentary wing

Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats)

Originally formed as Bevara Sverige Svenskt (BSS) in 1979, the Sweden Democrats in the September 2002 election developed into the largest party outside the national parliament. SD won 76 300 votes (1.4 percent) nationally, which translates into close to 50 seats in local municipalities. For a party that only a few years previously was known to be heavily influenced by neo-Nazi groups, this is a tremendous breakthrough.

Party leader is Mikael Jansson, a former local deputy of the mainstream Centre Party who defected to the SD in 1993. His main task has been to distance the SD from its past Nazi image.

A book on the Sweden Democrats published in November 2001 established that as many as 23 percent of the party's leading activists (330 individuals who had either been public election candidates or members of the national party executive sometime between 1988-1998) had been sentenced in a court of law. This would make the Sweden Democrats the incomparably most criminally burdened party in Sweden; the crimes represents a cross section of the law book ranging from assaults, wife beating, fraud, incitement, cruelty to animals, car theft, drunk driving and numerous other crimes.⁵¹

SD is very close to the Front National in France and Jansson was among the international guests that helped kick off Jean-Marie Le Pen's successful presidential election campaign in February 2002.

SD's is today the only »national« organisation with a seasoned activist cadre, good finances and stable local party branches. The party's strongest electoral support is in Skåne in South Sweden (22 000 votes), Gothenburg (12 000 votes) and the greater Stockholm area (11 000 votes.)

Curiously, until 1998 the Sweden Democrats was named in the PCS annual report as an »extreme nationalist organisation«. Although the SD has produced some of the most inflammatory anti-immigration tracts, the party has been dropped from the PCS report since 1999.

Fri Information (Free Information)

A lobby group against immigration formed by Conservative Party member Eva Bergqvist in 1991. Fri Information is publishing a magazine with the same name, which has become an

⁵¹ *Sverigedemokraterna – den nationella rörelsen* by Stieg Larsson and Mikael Ekman (Ordfront 2001)

increasingly important forum for the whole anti-immigration spectre. FI supported the Sweden Democrats in the 2002 elections.

Blagula Fragor (Blue-Yellow Questions)

Launched in 1995 by former Green Party member Anders Sundholm and former Social Democrat Jan Milld, BGF has styled itself as a »progressive« group questioning immigration in Sweden. BGF is a very small group but has a wide ideological influence on the entire »national« scene. BGF claims to be an »anti-racist« organisation that only wishes to encourage »debate« on the immigration issue; in reality the group is firmly connected with a number of well known profiles in the »national« movement. In 2002 Jan Mills joined the Sweden Democrats as a public candidate in the Stockholm area.

Folkviljan och Massinvandringen (People's Will and Mass Immigration)

A lobby group closely associated with Fri Information and the Sweden Democrats. A predecessor of FoM, The Association for National and International Development, was exposed in 1996 as a secret lobby group coordinating letter campaigns to media and government offices protesting immigration. FoM has been mostly inactive in recent years.

Nationaldemokraterna (National Democrats)

Formed as a splinter from the Sweden Democrats in 2001, the National Democrats participated in the 2002 election with a fierce anti-SD profile. The party won 4 000 votes and four seats in local municipalities.

Party leader is Anders Steen, a former member of the SD national executive and one of the party's eight local councillors following the 1998 election. Although the ND has styled itself as a »respectable« organisation, the party in 2002 have attracted a score of known Nazi activists. Party propaganda is fiercely anti-Islamic and anti-immigration. The party stronghold is in Haninge in south Stockholm, where the bulk of the SD branch defected with Anders Steen.

6.2 The white power wing

Nationalsocialistisk Front (National Socialist Front)

Launched in 1994, the NSF is Sweden's currently best-organised NS organisation. The party is headquartered in Karlskrona in south Sweden. The NSF was originally led by Anders Högström, who after many years of ardent party work defected and abandoned National Socialism in late 1999; Högström is today touring schools with an anti-Nazi message. Following his defection the NSF has been led by a committee leadership, with Anders Årleskog and Björn Björkqvist as nominal leaders. The NSF has a few hundred-core members.

Taking its queue from the Lindholm movement of the 1930s, NSF represents a »classic« national socialist party building ideology. The party expanded rapidly in the late 1990s. The organisation is today represented in a dozen local towns, mostly in the southern half of Sweden. In the last two years, however, the expansion has come to an end and in 2002 the

party shows signs of beginning to disintegrate. An important local branch, NSF/Klippan in Skane, dissolved in 2002 favour of a new local organisation, **Nationell Framtid (National Future)**

The party programme calls for the establishing of a state race institute which shall guarantee the »spiritual and biological health of the Nordic race«. ⁵² Anti-Semitism and race biology are two dominant factors in the party ideology.

NSF also houses a number of activists that have previously been sentenced for violent crimes. Party leader Anders Årleskog and several other members have participated in military exercises with a paramilitary group, the so-called Legion Wasa. ⁵³ A television documentary in September 2002 was able to show internal videos of party members training with military hardware. ⁵⁴ Party propaganda chief Björn Björkqvist is on record for stating that the party will attempt to work within the frame of the democratic society, but should the party be banned or otherwise prevented from organising, they will have no alternative but to take up armed struggle.

Nationell Ungdom (National Youth)

Formed in Stockholm in 1996, National Youth originally enjoyed the support of the Sweden Democrats, which also initially donated money to the organisation's fund. ⁵⁵ NU was launched as a » non-political youth club« aiming to attract youngsters in general who were interested in sports and paint-ball games. The group was soon exposed as a Nazi front organisation in the media, and all pretence was soon dropped.

For a while the National Youth was the largest NS organisation in the Stockholm area. Since 2001, however, a large portion of the membership has joined the National Democrats, which is seen as a possible parliamentary wing for the NS movement.

Svenska Motståndsrörelsen (Swedish Resistance)

The National Youth is closely related to Swedish Resistance, which houses several former activists in the White Aryan Resistance (VAM) who are returning to the streets following convictions in the early 1990s. Klas Lund, a former VAM leader, re-appeared as the editor of the SMR magazine *Folktribunen* (The People's Tribune).

SMR/NU are closely allied with the American Nazi organisation the National Alliance, and functions as the Scandinavian voice of Dr. William Pierce, author of the »terrorist bible« the *Turner Diaries* and an advocate of political terrorism against the ZOG state. ⁵⁶ In 1999 William Pierce also bought the Nordland white power record company, which soon merged with the National Youth.

Several members or activists associated with SMR/NU have been arrested for arms thefts and violent crimes in recent years, most notably the assassination of trade unionist Björn

⁵² NSF *grundstenar*; basic party principles.

⁵³ *Expo* magazine, *Legion Wasa exposed*, 1-2002.

⁵⁴ *Insider*, TV3, 5 September 2002; a programme by Mikael Ekman and Richard Slätt.

⁵⁵ *Sverigedemokraterna – den nationella rörelsen* by Stieg Larsson & Mikael Ekman. (Ordfront 2001)

⁵⁶ William Pierce died in August 2002.

Söderberg in 1999. Söderberg was killed by three activists also suspected for involvement in the 1999 car bombing of journalists Peter Karlsson and Katarina Larsson.

Info-14

Edited by Robert Vesterlund, a former youth leader of the Sweden Democrats, the pro-terrorist Info-14 magazine has openly supported the 1999 police killers from Malexander, the assassination of Björn Söderberg and the car bombing of journalists Peter Karlsson and Katarina Larsson.

Since 2000 Info-14 is published only on Internet. Robert Vesterlund was last year sentenced to prison for possession of an illegal firearm.

Info-14 is also allegedly doubling as the Anti-Antifa of the movement, that is the Nazi »Intelligence Service« mapping out political enemies and critical journalists.

Blood & Honour/Scandinavia

An international white power company headquartered in Helsingborg in south Sweden, B&H is through the company Ragnarock Records one of Europe's largest producers of white power propaganda videos and CD:s. Led by Erik Blücher, formerly a leader of the Norwegian National Peoples Party in the 1980s, B&H is closely associated with the militant group Combat 18 in Britain.

In many respects B&H is one of the most important propaganda organisations in Europe, with membership sections in, among other countries, Britain, United States, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Germany⁵⁷, Czech Republic, Serbia and Hungary.

⁵⁷ Banned in 2000, but now being reorganized under at different name.

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